Who Has an Interest in Preserving Nationality-Based Privileges?

Political Power, Democratic Self-Government, and Resistance to Membership Reform

Imagine two people living on the same street.

Both work, pay taxes, use public services, and care about the future of their community.

One was born a citizen. The other moved there from another country and has lived there for many years.

The first can vote in national elections. The second cannot.

In some countries, the difference also extends to local elections.

Suppose someone proposes changing the rules so that long-term residents can become equal political members without first obtaining the nationality of the country where they live.

Who would oppose the proposal?

We might expect those who benefit from the existing system to defend it. But benefiting from an institution and defending it are different things. So is providing a justification for that institution.

We need to ask three questions.

Who benefits from the existing membership rules? Who actively works to preserve them? And what reasons are offered to justify their preservation?

The answers may overlap, but they are not necessarily the same.

Some people may fear losing political influence. Others may believe that democratic self-government requires a community to control its membership. Still others may worry about security, social solidarity, or cultural continuity.

Understanding political reform requires examining not only those who seek change, but also those who possess the power to resist it.

Beneficiaries and Defenders

Nationality ordinarily provides a legal basis for membership in a state and for the political rights attached to that membership.

Ayelet Shachar has compared birthright citizenship to inherited property. Her argument draws attention to valuable rights and opportunities transmitted through the circumstances of birth.

I examined that argument in Ayelet Shachar and the Birthright Lottery.

Here, the concern is narrower.

Existing citizens generally possess the electoral rights through which their political institutions are governed. Long-term foreign residents may live under many of the same laws without enjoying equivalent political influence.

Those who already belong can participate in deciding whether the rules of belonging should change.

This gives existing political members a structural advantage.

But not every citizen seeks to preserve that advantage.

Consider a citizen who believes that long-term foreign residents should be allowed to vote in local elections.

That citizen already possesses the right in question. Supporting its extension does not require surrendering the right.

Another citizen may oppose the proposal because of a belief about national sovereignty or democratic membership.

The two citizens occupy the same formal position under the existing electoral rules, yet they reach different political conclusions.

Their motivations cannot be inferred solely from the benefits they receive.

The distinction between beneficiaries and defenders is therefore important.

The first category concerns the distribution of advantages. The second concerns political action.

And political action raises another question: what reasons do people give for defending the existing rules?

Why Do People Defend Membership Rules?

Some reasons concern political power.

Extending voting rights changes the electorate. Political parties and elected officials may anticipate changes in electoral competition.

A party may believe that a proposed reform would strengthen its opponents. Another may expect to gain support from newly eligible voters.

But political calculations are not the only possible motivation.

Other arguments concern democratic institutions.

A political community must maintain public order, administer justice, raise revenue, provide services, and make decisions that bind its residents.

Those who defend existing membership rules may argue that changes to the electorate should be made cautiously because they affect the institutions through which the community governs itself.

Security and institutional stability can be legitimate concerns.

So can cultural continuity and social solidarity.

A shared language, public institutions, and political traditions may help people cooperate despite disagreements.

Yet these concerns do not automatically establish that long-term foreign residents must remain excluded from equal political membership.

The question is whether a particular restriction is necessary and justified.

A genuine concern about institutional stability may support transitional arrangements or specific conditions. It does not necessarily justify permanent inequality.

Similarly, a commitment to cultural continuity does not establish that people born abroad cannot participate in the culture of the community where they live.

Long-term residents may already share much of its everyday life.

We should distinguish protecting institutions from preserving exclusive political status.

The distinction is difficult because arguments for institutional protection can be sincere even when the restrictions they defend go further than necessary.

The strongest argument for political-community control deserves serious consideration.

Wellman, Walzer, and the Limits of Exclusion

Christopher Heath Wellman defends a right of legitimate states to exclude prospective immigrants.

His argument draws on political self-determination and freedom of association.

If a political community has the right to govern itself, he argues, that right includes authority to determine whom it admits.

This presents a serious challenge to Foot Democracy—the freedom to choose the political community to which one belongs.

But Wellman’s argument primarily concerns the admission of prospective immigrants.

The position of people already living within the community raises another question.

A person may spend decades under its laws, contribute to its economy, raise a family, and develop lasting relationships with other residents.

That person is not simply an outsider seeking initial admission.

The community already governs much of that person’s life.

Does the authority to control admission also justify keeping such a person permanently outside equal political membership?

Michael Walzer offers an important distinction.

In Spheres of Justice (1983), Walzer recognizes that political communities possess authority over admission. Yet he strongly criticizes the permanent exclusion of foreign workers who have already become part of the society in which they live.

People who work within a community, live under its laws, and contribute to its common life should have a path to citizenship.

Otherwise, existing citizens may exercise political authority over people who are subject to the same institutions but cannot participate equally in governing them.

Walzer’s position does not go as far as the World Citizen framework.

He primarily considers access to citizenship through naturalization. The World Citizen framework examines the possibility of full political membership without requiring a person to abandon an existing nationality.

Nevertheless, his argument reveals an important point.

Recognizing a community’s authority over admission does not necessarily justify the permanent political exclusion of people it has already admitted.

This is where Hand Democracy—the collective self-government of a political community—and Foot Democracy come into tension.

Collective self-government cannot automatically justify unlimited exclusion. Political-community choice must also address the responsibilities of communities that receive new members.

Japan provides a concrete example of how difficult the political question can become.

Japan: When Constitutional Permission Is Not Enough

On February 28, 1995, Japan’s Supreme Court delivered an important judgment concerning voting rights in local elections for foreign nationals.

The Court held that the Constitution did not guarantee foreign nationals the right to vote for local government heads and assembly members.

But it also stated that the Constitution did not prohibit the Diet from granting such rights by law to permanent residents and others with particularly close ties to their local communities.

The Constitution did not require reform, but the Court left room for the Diet to act.

In the years that followed, bills proposing local voting rights for permanent foreign residents were repeatedly submitted to the Japanese Diet.

Proposals appeared from 1998 onward.

For example, in 2000, lawmakers associated with Komeito and the Conservative Party submitted a bill concerning local electoral rights for permanent foreign residents.

Further proposals followed, but the efforts did not result in the general extension of local electoral voting rights to permanent foreign residents.

The political difficulty became particularly visible in 2010.

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was leading the governing coalition, and legislation extending local voting rights to permanent foreign residents was under consideration.

But the coalition itself was divided.

In February 2010, Shizuka Kamei, a cabinet minister and leader of the People’s New Party, stated in the Diet that he and his party opposed granting voting rights to permanent foreign residents.

His party was a member of the governing coalition.

The government was considering legislation, but support within the leading party did not guarantee agreement among the parties needed to govern.

Opposition was not confined to national politics.

Around the same period, numerous prefectural assemblies adopted resolutions opposing or urging caution over proposals to extend local voting rights to permanent foreign residents.

The arguments included national sovereignty, constitutional interpretation, and concerns about the consequences of changing local electorates.

Some local assemblies supported extending political rights, but organized opposition had become visible across multiple levels of government.

These developments do not establish that one party or one group caused the legislation to fail.

They show something more limited, but important.

The existing membership rules were defended through identifiable political organizations and institutions.

The people affected included ethnic Koreans whose families had lived in Japan for generations. Some were born, raised, and educated in Japan, yet remained unable to vote even in local elections because they did not possess Japanese nationality.

Their lives were deeply connected to the communities in which they lived.

Nevertheless, extending voting rights required political agreement among people who already possessed those rights.

The 1995 Supreme Court judgment had left room for legislation. It could not provide the political agreement necessary to enact it.

This was not merely a debate about whether foreign residents contributed to their communities.

It was also a struggle over who would be included in the electorate—and who possessed the authority and political strength to determine that question.

Political Opposition, Legal Limits, and Institutional Power

The Japanese experience helps us distinguish three ways in which existing membership rules can be maintained.

The first is political opposition.

Political parties, legislators, and organized groups may resist proposals to expand political participation.

The second is legal limitation.

A constitution or statute may restrict what particular institutions are permitted to do.

The third is judicial enforcement.

Courts may invalidate reforms that exceed those legal limits.

The New York City noncitizen voting case provides an example of the latter two mechanisms.

In 2022, the city adopted a law that would have extended municipal voting rights to certain noncitizen residents.

In March 2025, the New York Court of Appeals held that the law violated the state constitution.

The majority read the state constitution as limiting voting rights to citizens. The dissent disagreed with that reading but still considered a local referendum necessary under state law.

The case concerned the legal authority of the city to enact the reform.

A judicial decision enforcing existing constitutional rules is different from a political campaign opposing reform.

Yet those constitutional rules are themselves part of an institutional order established through historical political processes.

If existing rules prevent a desired reform, political actors may need to change them through legislation or constitutional procedures.

Here the distribution of political power becomes decisive.

A relatively small but well-organized group may possess substantial influence over legislation.

A political party may prevent a proposal from obtaining the necessary agreement.

A constitutional provision may require a more demanding procedure than ordinary legislation.

A court may enforce that provision even when elected representatives support reform.

The political strength of those preserving an institution cannot be measured simply by counting how many people benefit from it.

We must examine the organizations, procedures, and legal authorities through which the rules are maintained.

Who Has the Power to Preserve the Rules?

Return to the two people living on the same street.

Their different political rights do not arise from how much they contribute to their community. They arise from membership rules maintained through political institutions in which only one of them currently has an electoral voice.

The beneficiaries of an institution are not necessarily its defenders. Those who defend it may do so for different reasons.

And the people who justify an institution are not necessarily those who possess the political power to maintain it.

The World Citizen Revolution must therefore be understood as a political struggle over the rules of belonging—and over the power to change those rules.

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Notes

1. Birthright citizenship and inherited privilege. Ayelet Shachar compares birthright citizenship to inherited property in The Birthright Lottery (2009). The analogy concerns the inherited distribution of valuable membership advantages rather than an identity between citizenship and private property.
2. Wellman and exclusion. Christopher Heath Wellman’s defense of a legitimate state’s right to exclude primarily concerns prospective immigrants. His argument draws on political self-determination and freedom of association.
3. Walzer and naturalization. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (1983), Chapter 2, “Membership.” Walzer recognizes a limited authority over initial admission while arguing against permanent political exclusion of settled foreign workers. His proposed path to citizenship differs from full political membership without a nationality change.
4. Japan’s 1995 Supreme Court judgment. The decision did not guarantee foreign nationals local electoral voting rights. It stated, in reasoning not necessary to reject the particular claim, that legislation granting such rights to certain permanent residents would not be constitutionally prohibited.
5. Japanese legislative proposals. Bills concerning local voting rights for permanent foreign residents were submitted repeatedly beginning in 1998. The 2000 proposal by Komeito and the Conservative Party is documented in the House of Representatives’ legislative records.
6. Political opposition in 2010. At the House of Representatives Budget Committee on February 15, 2010, Shizuka Kamei stated his opposition and that of the People’s New Party to granting voting rights to permanent foreign residents. The government’s representatives acknowledged that the proposed legislation was under consideration while disagreements remained within the coalition.
7. Local assembly resolutions. Around 2010, multiple prefectural assemblies adopted resolutions opposing the proposed extension of local voting rights. Official records include resolutions by the Miyagi, Miyazaki, and Ehime prefectural assemblies. Other local assemblies supported the extension of political rights.
8. Special permanent residents. Japan’s special permanent resident status has a distinct historical and legal background. The category includes people born in Japan, but it should not be equated with ordinary permanent residence, nor should all special permanent residents be assumed to share the same personal history.
9. New York City. In Fossella v. Adams (March 20, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals held that New York City’s Local Law 11 violated the New York State Constitution. The dissent disagreed on constitutional interpretation but considered a referendum necessary under the Municipal Home Rule Law.
10. Analytical categories. Beneficiaries, defenders, and justifications are distinguished for political analysis. They do not identify mutually exclusive social groups or an empirically established classification covering every case.

Further Reading

Books

• The World Citizen Revolution — Economic interests and political actors in institutional change.
• The World Citizen Society — Hand Democracy and Foot Democracy.
• Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality.
• Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality.

Related Essays

• Ayelet Shachar and the Birthright Lottery
• Who Will Fight for the Freedom to Choose a Political Community?
• Can Economic Freedom Lead to Political Equality?
• Who Gets to Decide Who Belongs?

References

1. Shachar, Ayelet. The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. Harvard University Press, 2009. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjhzr8r
2. Wellman, Christopher Heath, and Phillip Cole. Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude? Oxford University Press, 2011. https://academic.oup.com/book/4294/chapter/146183877
3. Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. Basic Books, 1983, Chapter 2, “Membership.” https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/BordersWalzer.pdf
4. Supreme Court of Japan. Judgment of February 28, 1995, Minshū, Vol. 49, No. 2, p. 639. Government response quoting the judgment (October 29, 2010). https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/syuisyo/176/touh/t176054.htm
5. House of Representatives of Japan. Bill concerning local electoral rights for permanent foreign residents, 148th Diet, House Bill No. 1 (2000). https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/keika/E952.htm
6. House of Representatives of Japan. Budget Committee, February 15, 2010. https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigirokua.nsf/html/kaigirokua/001817420100215011.htm
7. Miyagi Prefectural Assembly. Resolution opposing legislation granting local voting rights to permanent foreign residents, 2010. https://www.pref.miyagi.jp/site/kengikai/ikensho2202.html
8. Miyazaki Prefectural Assembly. Resolution opposing legislation granting local voting rights to permanent foreign residents, 2010. https://www.pref.miyazaki.lg.jp/documents/82541/201002_10.pdf
9. Ehime Prefectural Assembly. Resolution opposing legislation granting local voting rights to permanent foreign residents, 2010. https://www.pref.ehime.jp/site/gikai/12946.html
10. New York Court of Appeals. Fossella v. Adams, 2025 NY Slip Op 01668, March 20, 2025. https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2025/2025_01668.htm