Can Economic Freedom Lead to Political Equality?

Labor Mobility, Political Membership, and the Limits of Market Integration

Imagine a young woman from Vietnam arriving in Japan to work at a food-processing factory.

She wants to earn a living. The factory needs workers. For now, their interests coincide.

Years pass. She learns Japanese, makes friends, and becomes familiar with life in the town. Perhaps she wants to change jobs. Perhaps she hopes to stay.

What would allow her to become an equal political member of that community?

The woman is hypothetical, but the institutional question is real.

Japan is changing its system for accepting foreign workers. The new framework may improve important aspects of their working lives. Yet the freedom to work, the security of residence, and the right to participate in government are governed by different rules.

Can economic freedom lead to political equality?

It can create opportunities for change. It cannot decide how far that change will go.

Japan offers a useful example because the economic and political questions can be examined within the same legal system.

Japan's Changing Approach to Foreign Workers

Japan's Technical Intern Training Program was officially designed to transfer skills to developing countries.

Technical interns also worked in Japanese industries that needed labor. The difference between the stated purpose and the program's economic function became increasingly difficult to ignore.

In 2024, Japan enacted legislation establishing a replacement system.

The Employment for Skill Development program, known as Ikusei Shūrō (育成就労), is scheduled to begin on April 1, 2027.

Its purposes include developing workers' skills and securing labor in sectors facing shortages.

Japan's need for foreign workers is now an explicit part of the program's design.

The legislation also provides for greater freedom to move between employers, although that freedom remains conditional. Certain workers will continue under the earlier technical intern arrangements during the transition.

The new system has not yet begun operating. Its actual effects on working conditions and workers' choices remain to be seen.

Nevertheless, its legal design provides an opportunity to examine what economic reform can achieve—and what questions it leaves unresolved.

The Freedom to Leave an Employer

Consider the difference between being admitted for employment and being free to change jobs.

Under the Technical Intern Training Program, transfers between training organizations were restricted. They could be permitted when continuing the original placement became difficult for qualifying reasons, including certain serious abuses.

The new system also provides for transfers requested by workers themselves.

But the right is not unconditional.

Workers must satisfy requirements involving skills, Japanese-language ability, the category of work, and the receiving employer. A sector-dependent waiting period, generally between one and two years, also applies.

These details affect the worker's bargaining position.

Someone who can realistically move to another employer may be better able to challenge poor treatment. Someone who faces substantial obstacles to leaving may hesitate, even when labor law formally protects that person.

The ability to leave an employer can make other rights more effective.

I regard this as an important improvement in individual freedom.

But it remains freedom within an employment system. It does not give workers the freedom to choose the political community to which they belong.

Recognizing this limit does not diminish the value of the reform. It helps us understand what kind of freedom is being expanded.

Work, Residence, and Membership

Japan's new program is designed to connect with the Specified Skilled Worker system.

Japan has two categories of Specified Skilled Worker status. Category (i) generally permits a cumulative stay of up to five years, while Category (ii) offers the possibility of a longer stay for workers who meet higher qualification requirements. Category (ii) has no equivalent overall residence limit and permits family accompaniment under applicable conditions.

A longer life in Japan is therefore possible for some foreign workers. It would be wrong to describe the entire system as permitting only temporary employment.

But moving between statuses is conditional.

Permanent residence involves a further set of requirements. Under the ordinary criteria, periods spent as a technical intern or Specified Skilled Worker (i) do not count toward the relevant five-year requirement under qualifying work or residence statuses. Time under Specified Skilled Worker (ii) can count.

These rules can have substantial consequences for individuals and families.

For the political question, however, one distinction is enough.

Permission to work, permission to remain, and membership in a political community are different things.

A person may develop lasting relationships in Japan while remaining outside its electorate.

Even permanent residence does not itself confer the voting rights of Japanese nationals.

Economic reform can make it possible for someone to build a life in another country. Whether that person can become an equal political member remains a separate question.

Economic Opening and Residence Security

The 2024 legislation contains another development worth examining.

The same Act that established the new employment system also introduced additional grounds for revoking permanent-resident status.

These include deliberate failure to pay taxes or social insurance contributions, certain violations of immigration-law obligations, and specified criminal-law violations resulting in imprisonment.

The new provisions are scheduled to take effect on April 1, 2027.

An unpaid tax bill does not automatically result in cancellation of permanent residence. The legislation concerns specified grounds for revocation, and the Immigration Services Agency's October 2026 guidelines require consideration of individual circumstances. Where appropriate, a change to another residence status may be permitted instead of requiring departure from Japan.

The government presents these measures as a means of ensuring compliance with immigration law and public obligations. Critics have questioned their implications for the security of long-term residence.

The legal safeguards and the concerns both deserve attention.

The legislation does not establish that greater economic openness caused a reduction in residence security. The reforms address different policy objectives.

But their combination raises an important question.

Japan was establishing a more explicit framework for recruiting and developing foreign workers while also changing the circumstances in which an existing permanent resident could lose that status.

Greater openness to foreign labor does not necessarily mean greater security for foreign residents.

A country may expand access to employment while preserving, or even strengthening, certain conditions on residence.

The direction of change must be examined separately for each right.

The Constitution Leaves a Political Choice

Japan's Supreme Court addressed a different part of the problem on February 28, 1995.

The case concerned voting rights in local elections for foreign nationals.

The Court held that the Japanese Constitution did not itself guarantee foreign nationals the right to vote for local government heads and assembly members.

But the Court also stated that the Constitution did not prohibit Japan's national legislature, the Diet, from granting those electoral rights by law to permanent residents and others who had developed particularly close ties with their local communities.

That statement did not require the Diet to enact such a law. It also did not give foreign residents the electoral rights in question.

The judgment left room for political choice.

Constitutional permission is not the same as political action.

The Court identified room for legislative choice. Whether to use that room remained a matter for political institutions.

This shows why economic integration cannot settle the question of membership by itself.

A worker may live in Japan for decades. A company may value that worker's contribution. The Constitution may leave open the possibility of extending particular political rights by legislation.

Still, someone must propose, support, debate, and enact the law.

A constitutionally permissible reform does not become reality merely because economic circumstances make it desirable.

Political rights are not a reward that markets automatically distribute when a person's economic contribution becomes sufficiently valuable. They must be established through political decisions, often against opposition.

Musashino — Who Gets a Voice?

The difficulty became visible in Musashino, a city in Tokyo, in 2021.

The city proposed an ordinance establishing a local referendum system.

Under the proposal, residents aged 18 or older who had been registered in the city's Basic Resident Register (the official record of registered residents) for at least three consecutive months would have been eligible to participate, regardless of nationality.

Japanese nationals and foreign nationals would therefore have been subject to the same basic age and residence requirements.

This was a concrete proposal to make residence, rather than nationality, the basis for participation in a particular form of local decision-making.

The proposal did not give foreign nationals the right to elect the mayor, city assembly members, or national legislators. It concerned a nonbinding residents' referendum through which the community could express its views.

The city assembly rejected the ordinance on December 21, 2021.

One need not assume that everyone opposing the ordinance rejected all political participation by foreign residents. The controversy also involved the proposed conditions for participation and the proper scope of a residents' referendum.

Nevertheless, the outcome illustrates the political difficulty.

Even this limited form of participation, which would not have displaced the legal authority of elected representatives, could not obtain sufficient political support.

The proposed system would have recognized that people who share life in a municipality may have a legitimate interest in expressing their views about its future, regardless of nationality.

But the proposal itself required a political decision by institutions operating under the existing rules of membership. Those already holding political authority had to decide whether to extend a new form of participation to others.

Economic contribution could not settle that decision. Nor could years of residence, by themselves, establish the proposed right.

What Would Make Economic Freedom Lead to Equality?

Japan's experience suggests that economic reforms may create conditions favorable to political change.

Greater freedom to change employers can reduce dependence on a particular company. More secure residence can give people greater confidence in building lasting relationships with their communities.

These developments may make it easier for foreign residents to organize, express their interests, and demand political participation.

But they do not establish a direct path from labor-market reform to political equality.

In the previous essay, Who Will Fight for the Freedom to Choose a Political Community?, I examined why groups with different interests might cooperate to change political institutions.

The Japanese case brings that question closer to everyday life.

Employers may seek a stable labor force. Workers may seek better working conditions. Local residents may support greater participation for neighbors who have lived among them for many years.

Their interests can overlap without becoming identical.

A coalition that supports labor recruitment may have little reason to pursue political membership reform once its employment objectives have been achieved.

Those seeking political equality cannot assume that economic beneficiaries will continue supporting them.

The people whose political status is at stake must therefore participate in defining the objectives of reform. They cannot depend entirely on employers, political parties, or existing citizens to determine how far the change should go.

Economic freedom may give people greater resources and opportunities to act. It does not substitute for their political agency.

If the objective is equal political membership, that objective must be pursued in its own right.

Economic Opening Is Not the Final Victory

Return to the woman from Vietnam.

Suppose that, after many years, she qualifies for Specified Skilled Worker (ii), continues working in food production, and establishes a home in Japan with her family. Her children may attend local schools. She may pay taxes, participate in neighborhood activities, and care deeply about the community's future.

Yet none of these circumstances, by itself, gives her the right to vote for the municipality's mayor or assembly members. Even participation in a nonbinding residents' referendum depends on whether an appropriate system has been established.

Her economic and social life may become deeply rooted in Japan while her political position remains different from that of Japanese nationals.

This is not a prediction about one woman's future. It is the institutional possibility that the Japanese case asks us to confront.

Japan's new employment system may bring valuable improvements. We should judge its effects after implementation, using evidence about workers' experiences and the operation of the rules.

But employment reform alone cannot resolve the question of political belonging.

The 1995 Supreme Court judgment left room for legislation granting certain foreign residents local voting rights. In 2021, Musashino attempted to introduce a narrower form of participation through a residents' referendum. Neither event established those rights.

This is why I distinguish economic freedom from the political freedom at the center of World Citizen Theory.

Foot Democracy is not simply the freedom to enter a labor market or leave an employer. It concerns the meaningful freedom to choose which political community to belong to, and to become a member of that community.

Economic freedom may help people acquire the resources, security, and collective strength needed to demand that freedom.

But political equality requires institutional change and political action.

Economic freedom may open the door to political change. It does not decide how far that change will go.

The people seeking political freedom must continue to win, defend, and extend the rights that make meaningful political-community choice possible.

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Notes

1. Japan's Employment for Skill Development system. Act No. 60 of 2024 established the framework scheduled to begin on April 1, 2027, subject to transitional arrangements. The Act also amended provisions concerning permanent residents.

2. Worker-initiated transfers. Transfers under the new framework remain subject to requirements concerning skills, Japanese-language ability, work categories, sector-specific waiting periods, and receiving employers. Transfers based on unavoidable circumstances are governed by different rules.

3. Permanent-resident status and revocation. The new revocation provisions are scheduled to take effect on April 1, 2027. Under the Immigration Services Agency's October 2026 guidelines, deliberate nonpayment is not established merely by the existence of unpaid obligations. Relevant considerations include income and assets, the frequency, amount, and duration of arrears, payment history, circumstances leading to nonpayment, and the person's conduct. The law also provides for changes to another residence status in appropriate cases. Revocation or departure is not automatic.

4. The 1995 Supreme Court judgment. The judgment held that the Constitution does not guarantee foreign nationals voting rights in local elections. It also stated, in reasoning beyond what was necessary to reject the particular claim, that legislation granting such rights to certain permanent residents would not be constitutionally prohibited. The decision did not require the Diet to enact such legislation.

5. Musashino's proposed referendum ordinance. The 2021 proposal would have included residents aged 18 or older who had been registered in the city's Basic Resident Register for at least three consecutive months, without distinguishing eligibility by nationality. The proposed referendums would not have been legally binding. The ordinance was rejected on December 21, 2021.

6. Specified Skilled Worker (ii) in food manufacturing. Food and beverage manufacturing is an eligible field for Specified Skilled Worker (ii), subject to applicable qualifications and experience requirements. The hypothetical worker's progression to that status is an illustrative possibility, not an assumed entitlement.

Further Reading

Books

• The World Citizen Revolution — Economic interests, political agency, and institutional transformation.
• The World Citizen Society — Foot Democracy, political membership, and institutional transition.

Related Essays

• Who Gets to Decide Who Belongs?
• Branko Milanovic and the Citizenship Premium
• Who Will Fight for the Freedom to Choose a Political Community?

References

1. Immigration Services Agency of Japan. Employment for Skill Development System: Outline and Related Legislation. https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/03_00163.html

2. Immigration Services Agency of Japan. Employment for Skill Development System: Questions and Answers. https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/applications/faq/ikusei_qa_00002.html

3. Immigration Services Agency of Japan. Specified Skilled Worker System: Questions and Answers. https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/policies/ssw/faq.html

4. Government of Japan / JILPT. Act No. 60 of 2024 statutory text. https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/mm/hourei/houritsu/20240621.html

5. Government of Japan / JILPT. Cabinet Order No. 340 of 2025. https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/mm/hourei/seirei/20251001a.html

6. Immigration Services Agency of Japan. Guidelines on Revocation of Permanent Resident Status: Overview. https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/deportation/resources/nyukan_nyukan85_00002.html

7. Immigration Services Agency of Japan. Guidelines on Revocation of Permanent Resident Status: Full Text. https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/11_00118

8. Supreme Court of Japan / House of Representatives. Judgment of February 28 1995 and Government Response. https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/shitsumon/b174276.htm

9. Musashino City. Frequently Asked Questions about Proposed Residents Referendum Ordinance. https://www.city.musashino.lg.jp/shiseijoho/shisaku_keikaku/sogoseisakubu_shisaku_keikaku/1044160/jumintohyoseido/jumintohyojoreian_otoiawase/index.html

10. Musashino City. Public Comments and City Responses on Draft Referendum Ordinance. https://www.city.musashino.lg.jp/_res/projects/default_project/_page_/001/033/560/joureisoan_ikenitiran1.pdf

11. Immigration Services Agency of Japan. Specified Skilled Worker II: Food and Beverage Manufacturing. https://www.ssw.go.jp/about/visa/food_and_beverage_manufacturing_2/

12. Immigration Services Agency of Japan / MHLW. Operational Guidelines for Employment for Skill Development. https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/content/001458205.pdf