Political Interests, Democratic Ideals, and the Coalitions Behind Institutional Change
Imagine a business owner who wants to hire workers from another country.
The business needs people. The workers want jobs. Both may benefit if crossing the border becomes easier.
Now imagine that those workers have lived in the new country for fifteen years. They pay taxes, raise families, and depend on local schools and hospitals. But they still have no secure path to becoming equal political members.
Would the business owner support changing that?
Perhaps. But the business may already have obtained everything it needs.
The workers may want more than employment. They may want the freedom to belong.
This difference points to a question at the heart of the World Citizen Revolution.
Who will fight for the freedom to choose a political community?
It is not enough to describe the institutions that should exist. We must also ask who might struggle to create them, what those people want, and whether they need one another to succeed.
Freedom Does Not Mean the Same Thing to Everyone
An employer may want easier international recruitment. A worker may want to change employers without losing permission to stay. A family may want to build a secure home together.
A long-term resident may want an equal voice in the government of the community where the family lives.
These interests overlap, but they are not identical.
Someone can enter a country, work, and pay taxes without having a secure path to political membership.
This is why I distinguish economic mobility from Foot Democracy: the meaningful freedom to choose and join a political community.
Economic interests may help remove restrictions on movement. They do not, by themselves, secure equal political membership.
How far can those interests carry reform? What happens when people who supported the first change no longer want the next one?
Britain in 1832 — Reformers With Different Goals
Britain’s parliamentary reform of 1832 offers one comparison.
Industrial towns had grown in importance, but parliamentary representation still reflected older patterns of property and political influence.
Some reformers wanted greater representation for the middle classes. Others wanted voting rights to extend much further.
Parts of the middle and working classes cooperated. Yet they did not want exactly the same changes.
The Reform Act of 1832 redistributed parliamentary seats and expanded the electorate, particularly among middle-class men. Most working-class men remained without the vote, and women were excluded.
Much middle-class support for further reform declined afterward.
The Chartist movement, which emerged later in the 1830s, continued to demand wider voting rights and parliamentary reform. Its demands included votes for all adult men and the secret ballot.
The Chartists did not immediately achieve their goals. But they kept political exclusion on the agenda after the earlier reform had satisfied many of its supporters.
The groups involved were never perfectly united. Some middle-class reformers continued to support wider political participation.
In From the Struggle for the Vote to the Struggle for Political Choice, I examined how the struggle for voting rights relates to the freedom to choose a political community.
Here I want to ask what happens to the people seeking reform.
A coalition may weaken when some participants obtain what they wanted while others remain excluded.
That is not a law of history. It is a political risk.
Europe — Mobility and Political Membership
The European Union offers another comparison.
EU citizens enjoy extensive rights to move, reside, and work in other member states, subject to legal conditions.
Political rights have developed alongside these freedoms. EU citizens living in another member state can vote and stand for election in municipal and European Parliament elections there.
In 2026, the EU adopted revised rules intended to make participation in municipal elections easier for these citizens. Important parts of the rules are scheduled to apply from June 2028.
These are significant political achievements. European integration is not merely the creation of a larger labor market.
But the rights have limits.
EU law does not automatically give mobile EU citizens the right to vote in the national parliamentary elections of their host country.
The EU-wide electoral guarantees for mobile EU citizens also do not automatically apply to residents who are nationals of countries outside the Union.
Some member states provide additional voting rights under their own laws.
Governments, political parties, courts, workers, businesses, and others all helped shape European integration. It was not the achievement of economic interests alone.
The institutional result nevertheless shows a clear difference.
Movement can become easier while access to political membership remains limited or uneven.
The Interests Behind Political Opening
Who might support fewer restrictions on movement?
Employers may want to recruit workers. Universities may want to attract researchers. Workers may seek opportunities abroad, while families may want greater security when settling together.
Others may support reform because they consider inherited barriers to political membership unjust.
But support for one change does not settle someone’s position on every other change.
One employer may favor recruitment while resisting rules that let workers change jobs freely. Another may support secure residence because it helps retain experienced employees.
A union may oppose an employer-controlled visa system while supporting stronger rights for migrant workers.
Existing citizens may favor fair treatment of newcomers but disagree about the conditions for full political membership.
There are also disputes about public services, administrative capacity, and collective self-government. I have discussed these in The Four-Gap Audit and Who Gets to Decide Who Belongs?.
Here the question is narrower.
Which groups are prepared to support which reforms? And how much political influence do they possess?
In The World Citizen Revolution, I distinguish those who benefit from institutional change from those who actually organize to achieve it.
A business may benefit from easier migration without campaigning for it. A resident may demand political equality even when that demand offers no immediate economic advantage to others.
Benefiting from a reform is not the same as fighting to achieve it.
When Does Cooperation Become Necessary?
Consider two situations.
In the first, internationally active businesses have enough political influence to secure easier recruitment on their own.
They may support the reform, obtain it, and stop there. Some business leaders may personally favor political equality, but they do not need a broader coalition to achieve their immediate objective.
Now consider a different situation.
Businesses cannot secure reform alone. Resident organizations, trade unions, civic associations, and sympathetic political parties also want changes to existing rules.
Cooperation may become more attractive.
These groups might agree on easier entry, protection against labor exploitation, secure residence, and fairer opportunities to acquire political membership.
They need not share one ideology. They need enough agreement to pursue reforms together.
The contrast suggests a hypothesis.
The need for a coalition may depend not only on shared interests but also on the relative political strength of the groups seeking change.
A group strong enough to win a limited reform may have little reason to make broader commitments. A group unable to succeed alone may seek allies whose ultimate objectives differ from its own.
But political weakness does not automatically produce cooperation.
Potential partners may distrust one another. Their demands may conflict. Electoral incentives and institutional rules may make joint action difficult.
Even a coalition that overcomes these problems may lack the power to change the law.
The United States in 2013 — Cooperation Without Legislative Success
In 2013, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO, a major labor federation, negotiated over immigration reform.
Employers wanted a workable system for recruiting foreign workers. Labor organizations wanted protections against low wages, poor working conditions, and arrangements that could make migrant workers dependent on employers.
Their interests differed, but they reached an agreement concerning a proposed foreign-worker program.
That cooperation contributed to a broader effort to reform immigration law.
The Senate bill, S.744, addressed several matters, including border enforcement, employment-based immigration, and a proposed route toward legal status and eventual citizenship for eligible unauthorized immigrants.
The bill was a broader political compromise, not simply the business-labor agreement turned into legislation.
On June 27, 2013, the Senate passed S.744 by 68 votes to 32.
But it did not become law.
The bill failed to reach enactment amid broader political divisions and obstacles in Congress. That failure should not be confused with the collapse of the agreement between employers and unions.
The example shows that a coalition can overcome internal differences and still lack enough political power to change the law.
Agreement within a coalition is not the same as the power to win.
Can a Coalition Survive Its First Victory?
Now imagine a coalition that does succeed.
Employers gain easier access to workers. Migrants obtain stronger labor protections. Communities receive help in managing settlement.
These are worthwhile achievements.
But the people who have settled in the community may still lack a secure path to full political membership.
Access to employment, stable residence, local voting rights, and full political membership are different achievements.
A coalition may support the first reform without committing itself to the last.
What happens then?
Some participants may consider the work finished. Others will have to continue with fewer allies.
A coalition might make the stages of reform explicit from the beginning. It might agree that easier recruitment is an initial goal, while greater security and political equality remain part of a longer program.
But an agreement on paper cannot ensure that powerful participants will remain committed.
Those seeking equal membership may lack votes, resources, or secure legal status. They may need allies who already possess political rights.
They cannot remain merely the beneficiaries of a campaign negotiated by others.
They must be able to define their demands, challenge compromises, organize, and resist the reversal of rights already won.
The struggle may continue through new coalitions, with different participants and different political opportunities.
The issue is not simply whether a coalition can win. It is who gets to define victory—and who still has the political strength to continue afterward.
The Revolution Is a Political Process
Globalization may create pressure to open political communities. It will not automatically produce equal political membership.
The outcome depends on political interests, the balance of power, and the coalitions people build and sustain.
Rights must be won, institutionalized, defended against retreat, and expanded. Courts and public institutions can protect those achievements, but they cannot replace the people who struggle for them.
Opening a political community and making membership equal are not the same victory.
Foot Democracy requires people who understand that difference—and continue to act when the first reform is no longer enough.
Notes
- Britain’s Reform Act and Chartism. The Reform Act of 1832 redistributed parliamentary seats and changed voting qualifications. The People’s Charter of 1838 called for universal male suffrage, secret ballots, equal electoral districts, payment for Members of Parliament, abolition of MPs’ property qualifications, and annual parliamentary elections. This is a comparison of reform coalitions, not a claim that historical suffrage reform and modern migration reform have identical causes.
- EU electoral rights. Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides municipal and European Parliament electoral rights for mobile EU citizens under the applicable conditions. It does not itself confer host-country national parliamentary voting rights.
- Directive (EU) 2026/1194. This recast directive, adopted on May 26, 2026, replaces Directive 94/80/EC from June 26, 2028. Under Articles 17–19, specified national transposition measures are due by June 25, 2028, and relevant provisions apply from June 26, 2028.
- Additional local voting rights. Ireland allows eligible registered residents to vote in local elections regardless of nationality. These national rules are distinct from the rights guaranteed under EU law to mobile EU citizens.
- U.S. immigration reform. The Chamber of Commerce and AFL-CIO agreement concerned a proposed foreign-worker program. S.744 was a broader Senate immigration bill that included legalization and potential citizenship pathways. It was not enacted. Neither the proposed citizenship route nor the business-labor agreement should be equated with Foot Democracy.
Further Reading
Books
- The World Citizen Revolution — Historical transformation, economic actors, and the political conditions of revolution.
- The World Citizen Society — Freedom of political-community choice and the institutions of equal membership.
Related Essays
- From the Struggle for the Vote to the Struggle for Political Choice
- What Does Economic Freedom Mean in a World Citizen Society?
- The Four-Gap Audit: Why Reform Can Fail Even When the Goal Is Right
- Who Gets to Decide Who Belongs?
- No Permanent Transition: When Temporary Restrictions Become Permanent Inequality
References
- UK Parliament. The Reform Act 1832. https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/houseofcommons/reformacts/overview/reformact1832/
- UK Parliament. The Chartist Movement. https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/chartists/overview/chartistmovement/
- The National Archives (UK). What Caused the 1832 Great Reform Act? https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/teaching-resources/1832-great-reform-act/
- European Union. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 20–22 and 45. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT
- European Commission. Free Movement — EU Nationals. https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/moving-working-europe/working-another-eu-country/free-movement-eu-nationals_en
- Council of the European Union. Directive (EU) 2026/1194, May 26, 2026. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2026/1194/oj/eng
- U.S. Chamber of Commerce and AFL-CIO. Joint Statement of Shared Principles, February 21, 2013. https://www.aila.org/library/joint-statement-chamber-pres-afl-cio-president
- Congressional Research Service. Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S.744, 2013. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R43097.html
- U.S. Senate. Roll Call Vote 168: Passage of S.744, June 27, 2013. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1131/vote_113_1_00168.htm
- European Union. Municipal Elections — Your Europe. https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/residence/elections-abroad/municipal-elections/index_en.htm
- Electoral Commission of Ireland. Voter Eligibility. https://www.electoralcommission.ie/voter-eligibility/
