Why Protecting Residents Requires More Than Changing Political Authority
Imagine that a region has voted to become independent.
Supporters celebrate. A new political community is beginning to take shape.
But the police are no longer functioning reliably. Some officers remain loyal to the previous government. Others have left their posts. Armed groups move through the streets.
Families wonder whether their homes will be safe tonight.
The people have made a political decision. The institutions needed to protect them are not ready.
Who is responsible?
In the previous essay, I examined how established rights might survive the breakup of a political community. Residence, membership, and rights acquired over a lifetime should not disappear when political authority changes.
But a right written in law may offer little protection if the police, courts, and public institutions responsible for enforcing it cease to function.
Political freedom cannot survive a transition in which no institution remains responsible for protecting the people.
There is another danger. An authority brought in to restore security may acquire powers so extensive that the promised self-government becomes largely symbolic.
How can a political community avoid both failures?
East Timor — When a Vote Was Not Enough
On August 30, 1999, people in East Timor voted in a United Nations-organized consultation on a proposed special autonomy arrangement within Indonesia.
Approximately 78.5 percent rejected the proposal, opening the way toward independence.
The United Nations Mission in East Timor, or UNAMET, had organized the vote. Yet the result did not bring an immediate peaceful transition.
After the result was announced, pro-integration militias, at times supported by elements of the Indonesian security forces, carried out widespread violence and destruction. People were killed or displaced. Homes and public infrastructure were damaged.
UNAMET had helped people express their political choice. It did not have the military capacity to restore security when violence escalated.
Under the arrangements for the vote, Indonesia remained responsible for maintaining security. Its authorities failed to prevent the violence effectively.
There was a painful gap between making a democratic decision and being able to carry it out.
An institution may organize a legitimate vote without being capable of protecting the people who participate in it.
The urgent question was no longer only what East Timorese voters wanted.
It was who could protect them while their decision was being implemented.
Restoring Security and Governing a Territory
In September 1999, the United Nations Security Council authorized INTERFET, a multinational military force led by Australia.
Its tasks included restoring peace and security, supporting UNAMET, and helping humanitarian operations.
It was a response to an emergency.
The following month, the Security Council established another institution: the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, or UNTAET.
UNTAET was not simply another military force.
It was given broad authority to govern East Timor during the transition. Its powers included making laws, exercising executive authority, administering justice, maintaining public order, and rebuilding essential institutions.
In February 2000, military responsibility passed from INTERFET to the United Nations peacekeeping operation.
Restoring security and governing a territory are different tasks.
A force sent to stop violence needs powers appropriate to that emergency. An administration that makes laws and governs everyday life exercises much broader authority.
Both may be necessary.
But the second raises a deeper political question.
Who should govern a population seeking the right to govern itself?
When Outsiders Govern in the Name of Protection
UNTAET’s extensive powers reflected difficult circumstances. Violence had displaced residents and disrupted public institutions. Many services needed to be restored.
The administration was intended to help East Timor achieve self-government.
Yet international officials were also making major decisions for the people who lived there.
The Security Council required UNTAET to consult and cooperate closely with East Timorese people.
Consultation mattered. It was not the same as democratic control.
A National Consultative Council was established in late 1999. In 2000, new arrangements increased East Timorese participation through a National Council and a transitional cabinet.
The Transitional Administrator nevertheless retained extensive powers.
In August 2001, voters elected a Constituent Assembly to prepare a constitution. Timor-Leste became independent on May 20, 2002.
This was a real transfer of political authority.
But the experience leaves a question that goes beyond East Timor.
How can temporary outside protection strengthen self-government without becoming a substitute for it?
An administration may have legitimate reasons for exercising extraordinary powers. That does not remove the need to ask who can challenge its decisions, whose views count, and when its powers should end.
Who Protects Residents, and Under Whose Authority?
Military forces can help stop organized violence. They cannot replace ordinary public institutions.
Residents still need police who investigate crimes, courts that review arrests, and authorities able to carry out lawful decisions.
Consider a region approaching negotiated separation.
Its existing police service has officers who may answer to different governments after the transition.
Who investigates a crime committed during the handover? Which authority can order an arrest? Which court reviews it? Who investigates the police when officers abuse their powers?
These questions may seem less dramatic than an independence declaration.
They are not less important to the people living through the change.
Some transitions may require temporary joint policing. Others may use gradual transfers of authority or outside monitoring.
No single arrangement will work everywhere.
But residents must know who is responsible for their protection and where they can seek help when that authority acts unlawfully.
A new government cannot be judged only by its claim to rule. It must also be judged by whether its institutions can protect people—and whether people can hold those institutions accountable.
Security Autonomy Is Not Military Self-Sufficiency
Iceland has no standing armed forces.
Yet it is a member of NATO and has maintained a defense agreement with the United States since 1951. It also has its own police, coast guard, parliament, and government.
This is a useful reminder that a political community does not need to provide every military capability independently to exercise meaningful self-government.
In The World Citizen Society, I distinguish security self-sufficiency from security autonomy.
Self-sufficiency means being able to provide security without substantial outside assistance.
Security autonomy means retaining meaningful political control over one’s government and security commitments, even when some protection is supplied by allies or shared institutions.
Iceland does not show that outside defense relationships have no political costs. Security agreements create commitments, and those commitments can become subjects of domestic debate.
But it shows why the two ideas should not be confused.
A more serious danger arises when a powerful protector makes its assistance dependent on unrelated political concessions.
A community may possess its own parliament and laws while fearing that a disagreement with its protector could put its safety at risk.
Security assistance can then become a means of political pressure.
That is why communities sharing security risks need a meaningful voice in the arrangements that govern them.
They do not need a veto over every military decision.
But outside protection should not give a stronger partner general authority over the protected community’s political life.
Kosovo — Who Holds the Protectors Accountable?
Kosovo presents a further difficulty.
In June 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244. It provided for two international presences with different responsibilities.
KFOR was responsible for international security functions.
UNMIK, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, exercised broad responsibilities for civilian administration.
Dividing these functions can prevent all authority from being concentrated in one institution.
But it does not necessarily make those institutions accountable.
Suppose an international security force harms someone.
Who must answer for it?
In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights considered two applications arising from activities associated with the international presences in Kosovo.
One concerned an incident involving unexploded ordnance. The other concerned a detention under the international security arrangements.
In Behrami and Saramati, the Court concluded that the relevant conduct was, in principle, attributable to the United Nations.
In legal terms, this concerned which organization should be treated as responsible for the actions or failures in question.
Because the United Nations was not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court found that it could not examine the applications against the respondent states in those circumstances.
It declared them inadmissible.
That did not mean the Court had found that no human rights violation occurred.
It meant that the Court did not proceed to decide whether the complaints were justified.
Four years later, the Court examined a different situation.
In Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom (2011), a man had been detained by British forces in Iraq during an international military operation authorized by the Security Council.
The Court found that the detention was attributable to the United Kingdom, not the United Nations. It examined the actual arrangements of authority and control and concluded that the detention violated the right to liberty under Article 5 of the Convention.
This did not completely overturn Behrami and Saramati. The missions and circumstances were different.
But the contrast is important.
Being part of an international security operation does not automatically determine who is legally responsible for what its members do.
Kosovo also had a mechanism for examining complaints about its international administration.
UNMIK established a Human Rights Advisory Panel in 2006. The Panel later examined complaints alleging that UNMIK had violated human rights.
Its work was valuable. It offered a way to examine conduct that might otherwise have received little independent scrutiny.
But its authority had limits.
The Panel generally could not examine complaints against KFOR. And its findings and recommendations were advisory, not binding.
In practical terms, it could identify a human rights failure and recommend action. It could not, in the same way as a court issuing an enforceable judgment, compel UNMIK to provide the recommended remedy.
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General retained authority over the response.
Here the problem becomes clearer.
A resident may face an authority powerful enough to detain people, administer territory, or make rules.
Yet the available institutions for challenging that authority may have limited jurisdiction or lack the power to ensure a remedy.
The lesson is not that international protection should be rejected. At times, outside help may be indispensable.
It is that providing protection, bearing legal responsibility, and ensuring effective remedies are three different matters.
An institution should not become effectively unanswerable merely because its authority comes from an international mandate.
Who holds the protectors accountable?
That question must be answered when the institutions are created, not only after something goes wrong.
Security for Those Who Opposed the Change
A political transition must protect more than its supporters.
A region may vote for independence. Those who opposed separation remain residents.
Some may belong to linguistic or national minorities. Others may have close ties to the former state.
They may fear that the new police will treat them as political enemies.
Their safety cannot depend on whether they voted for the winning side.
Public security is an obligation owed to residents, not a reward for political loyalty.
This is where Resident Equality and Membership Security matter.
Full political members should not face arbitrary exclusion or loss of protection because of inherited nationality or political opposition.
Nor should dissenting residents be told that leaving is their only safe option.
They must be able to remain and participate as equals.
When Should Outside Forces Withdraw?
Temporary security arrangements cannot continue indefinitely simply because they were once necessary.
Yet a fixed withdrawal date may be dangerous.
If local police and courts cannot protect residents, transferring responsibility too quickly may create another crisis.
An open-ended mission presents the opposite risk. Outside officials may continue exercising powers that residents should eventually control.
A transition therefore needs public conditions for transferring responsibility.
Can the police operate under lawful civilian command? Can courts examine abuses? Are minorities protected? Is responsibility for serious security incidents clear?
Not every function must be transferred on the same day.
Nor does a community need complete military independence before it can govern itself.
But outside authorities should not be the only judges of whether their own extraordinary powers remain necessary.
Difficulties in one security function should not become a permanent excuse for retaining control over unrelated political matters.
The purpose is to maintain protection while expanding accountable self-government.
Timor-Leste — Independence Was Not the End of the Problem
Timor-Leste became independent in 2002. International assistance continued as domestic institutions developed.
In 2006, the country faced another serious political and security crisis.
Divisions within the armed forces and police contributed to the violence, alongside broader political tensions, institutional weaknesses, and social difficulties.
International assistance was requested. In August 2006, the Security Council established the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, or UNMIT.
This does not prove that independence was a mistake.
Nor does it prove that international officials should have continued governing indefinitely.
It shows something more limited.
The formal transfer of security authority and the creation of lasting security capacity are not the same achievement.
Police and military institutions need professional skills, workable command structures, public trust, and lawful ways to resolve disputes.
Those qualities do not appear automatically when a new government takes office.
They have to be built and maintained.
Security Must Remain Subject to Politics and Law
The World Citizen Society does not require every political community to maintain an independent army.
Nor does it require a single World Government to command all security institutions.
Some threats demand cooperation across territories. Ordinary policing and civilian protection often require institutions close enough to residents to remain accountable.
The challenge is to share necessary powers without allowing protection to become general political supremacy.
The cases examined here point to two requirements.
Someone must remain responsible for protecting residents.
That authority must also be answerable for how it exercises power.
Security is not an exception to democratic accountability.
Not every military decision can be made through public debate. Emergencies may require urgent action, and some information cannot be disclosed immediately.
But urgent action still requires lawful authority. Coercive power still requires oversight. And people whose rights are violated need a meaningful way to seek remedies.
Protection, legal responsibility, and effective remedy must not be allowed to drift apart.
Protecting Residents While Authority Changes
A vote can express a people’s wish to establish a new political order.
It cannot, by itself, keep them safe during the transition.
Outside assistance may be necessary. Yet providing protection does not give outsiders an unlimited right to govern. And an international mandate cannot take the place of accountability for the use of power.
Security during political transition requires an identifiable authority capable of protecting residents, but that authority must remain accountable, rights-bounded, and directed toward self-government.
A community should not be left defenseless in the name of independence.
Its residents should not have to surrender political freedom indefinitely in exchange for security.
The purpose of transition is not merely to replace one authority with another.
It is to create institutions through which people can live securely and govern their common lives.
Further Reading
Books
- The World Citizen Revolution
- The World Citizen Society — Especially Chapters 12 and 24, on security autonomy and security during territorial change.
Related Essays
- How Can Rights Survive Political Breakup?
- Can Political Power Be Divided Without Creating a World Government?
- Why Territory Still Matters in a World Citizen Society
- Why the World Citizen Society Cannot Be Created Overnight
- The Four-Gap Audit: Why Reform Can Fail Even When the Goal Is Right
- Once Entry Is Won, How Is It Protected?
References
- United Nations. UNMISET: Background — UNAMET and the Popular Consultation. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unmiset/background.html
- United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1264 (1999), September 15, 1999. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/283067
- United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1272 (1999), October 25, 1999. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/291410/
- United Nations. UNTAET Mandate. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/etimor/UntaetM.htm
- United Nations. Timeline of UN Missions in Timor-Leste. https://unmit.unmissions.org/en/timeline-of-un-missions-in-timor-leste
- United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1244 (1999), June 10, 1999. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/274488?ln=en
- European Court of Human Rights. Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, Decision on Admissibility, May 2, 2007. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-80830
- United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Regulation No. 2006/12 on the Establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel, March 23, 2006. https://unmik.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/regulations/02english/E2006regs/RE2006_12.pdf
- UNMIK Human Rights Advisory Panel. Final Report, June 2016. https://unmik.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/hrap_final_report_final_version_30_june_2016.pdf
- United Nations. Statement on the Publication of the Human Rights Advisory Panel’s Final Report, July 22, 2016. https://unmik.unmissions.org/en/node/67490
- NATO. NATO Member Countries — Iceland. https://nato.int/en/about-us/organization/nato-member-countries
- NATO. Iceland and NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/nato-history/history-by-theme/my-country-and-nato/iceland-and-nato
- United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1704 (2006), August 25, 2006. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/581761?ln=en
- European Court of Human Rights. Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 27021/08, Grand Chamber Judgment, July 7, 2011. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105612
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[…] the previous two essays, How Can Rights Survive Political Breakup? and How Can Security Be Maintained During Political Transition?, I examined how residents’ rights and public security might survive political […]
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