Francis Fukuyama – World Citizen Theory

Does Liberal Democracy Leave One Dimension of Political Freedom Unresolved?

A woman applies for citizenship in the country where she has made her home. She has lived there for years, speaks the language, and knows its institutions. She is asked to demonstrate not just her residence but also her commitment to the country’s constitutional principles.

That sounds reasonable. Democracies need people who respect the rules under which they govern themselves.

But what exactly is being tested? Knowledge of democratic institutions? Respect for other people’s rights? Or attachment to a particular national identity?

And which of these should determine whether someone can become a political equal?

These questions connect the work of Francis Fukuyama with the World Citizen framework. His theory of liberal democracy emphasizes equal recognition, while his later writing proposes concrete ways to build an inclusive national identity.

The question is not whether immigrants should ever become citizens. Fukuyama clearly believes they should.

It is what gives people their strongest claim to political membership.

What Remains After the End of History?

In his 1989 essay "The End of History?" and his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama argued that liberal democracy might represent the endpoint of ideological development: no fundamentally superior universal model of legitimate government had clearly emerged.

He did not mean that wars, political conflicts, or historical events would end.

An important part of his theory concerns recognition. People seek acknowledgment of their dignity, not only security or prosperity.

Fukuyama distinguishes two forms of this desire. Isothymia means wanting to be recognized as equal to others. Megalothymia means wanting to be recognized as superior.

Liberal democracy responds to the demand for equal recognition through political rights and institutions. But the desire for superiority does not disappear. Fukuyama therefore did not suggest that democracy would eliminate every political conflict.

His argument also leads to another question. Even if a democratic system treats its citizens as equals, how do people born elsewhere obtain the standing of citizens?

The legitimacy of a government and the justification of its membership rules are related, but they are not the same question.

Fukuyama’s Inclusive National Identity

Fukuyama has addressed immigration directly.

In "Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy" (2006) and his later work, he argues that democratic institutions need some shared sense of civic identity. People must cooperate, accept collective decisions, and maintain institutions even when they disagree about public policy.

But he distinguishes civic identity from ethnic ancestry. In Identity (2018) and "Against Identity Politics," he favors national belonging based on shared political principles rather than inherited ethnicity or religion.

His position has practical consequences. He criticizes citizenship systems heavily dependent on descent—that is, systems in which nationality passes primarily from parents to children.

He supports greater use of citizenship based on birth in the territory and opportunities for immigrants to become citizens through naturalization, the legal process of acquiring citizenship after birth.

For the United States, he also supports combining more effective enforcement of immigration laws with a pathway to citizenship for many undocumented immigrants without criminal records.

He emphasizes language learning, knowledge of public institutions, and commitment to constitutional principles.

For Fukuyama, citizenship should not be permanently closed to immigrants. But becoming a citizen also involves joining a community with shared democratic institutions and responsibilities.

The World Citizen framework recognizes the importance of these concerns. The difference lies in what should have priority when determining who may become a full political member.

Germany: Residence and Civic Commitments Together

Germany provides a useful example. Its citizenship system has changed substantially from the traditional approach in which descent played a dominant role.

On June 27, 2024, a reform reduced the normal residence requirement for naturalization from eight years to five. It also broadly permitted people to acquire German citizenship without giving up their previous nationality.

At the same time, the law emphasized commitments to Germany’s free democratic constitutional order and its special historical responsibility arising from the Nazi dictatorship, including the protection of Jewish life.

Certain antisemitic, racist, or other offenses showing contempt for human dignity can prevent naturalization.

The reform also introduced an accelerated route allowing naturalization after three years for applicants with exceptional integration achievements.

That special route was abolished with effect from October 30, 2025. The ordinary five-year residence requirement remained in place.

Germany therefore provides an example of residence requirements and civic commitments being adjusted together.

The country made ordinary naturalization available after fewer years of residence, while continuing to require evidence of civic integration and respect for constitutional principles.

It did not adopt Resident Sovereignty as defined by the World Citizen framework. Other conditions still matter, including language ability, administrative requirements, and the ability to support oneself, subject to exceptions.

A shorter waiting period also does not necessarily make citizenship attainable for everyone.

This is why we should look beyond the number of years required for naturalization.

The important question is whether people who have made a country their home have a realistic and fair route to full political membership.

Civic Creed or Durable Residence?

Imagine two questions posed to a person applying for citizenship.

The first asks whether she understands democratic institutions and is prepared to respect the rights of others.

The second asks whether she has adopted the majority’s preferred cultural habits, historical interpretations, or political opinions.

These are not equivalent.

Understanding the basic rules of democratic government can be a legitimate requirement. Demanding agreement with the majority’s wider cultural or political worldview is more difficult to justify.

Citizens already disagree about national history, religion, public policy, and the meaning of patriotism. Such disagreement is part of democratic life.

New citizens should not have to agree on matters about which existing citizens remain free to disagree.

Fukuyama’s view is more sophisticated than a demand for cultural uniformity. He regards shared constitutional commitments as an alternative to ethnic nationalism.

Nevertheless, questions remain. How demanding may a government make those commitments? Who decides whether applicants sincerely hold them? And what happens when the requirements change?

The World Citizen framework begins with Resident Sovereignty:

Durable residence, rather than inherited nationality, is the primary basis of ordinary political membership.

This does not mean that everyone receives full membership immediately upon entering a country. Nor does it mean that legitimate civic requirements are irrelevant.

But sufficiently durable residence must create a meaningful pathway toward full political membership. A government should not be able to postpone membership indefinitely by repeatedly raising its expectations of cultural integration.

The difference is not simply civic beliefs versus residence. It concerns which relationship establishes the basic claim to membership and which requirements may legitimately regulate the transition.

A government should be able to explain why each requirement is necessary and how its decisions can be challenged. Otherwise, the language of civic commitment may conceal an arbitrary power to exclude.

Can Civic Identity Grow Through Common Life?

Fukuyama does not treat civic identity as something established by a citizenship test alone.

In "Against Identity Politics," he proposes a program of national service through military or civilian activities, such as education or environmental conservation. His aim is to bring people from different backgrounds into shared public activities and strengthen civic solidarity.

He was not proposing that every immigrant must complete public service as a condition of naturalization. The distinction matters.

His proposal recognizes that a common political identity can develop through experience. Durable residence may work in a related way.

People live under the same laws, use public services, establish relationships, and confront common political problems. These experiences do not make everyone think alike. Nor should they.

But they can help people develop a sense of belonging to institutions they share.

The World Citizen framework can recognize the value of civic participation without making full membership a reward for exceptional public service.

Someone who is elderly, disabled, caring for family members, or otherwise unable to participate in a national service program should not have a weaker basic claim to political equality.

Nor should people have to demonstrate enthusiasm for a particular national identity.

Residence and common institutional life can help create civic connections. Such connections should not be confused with a requirement to adopt the majority’s beliefs.

Political Equality Beyond Birth

There is a difference between recognizing a person’s dignity and allowing that person to share political authority.

Noncitizens may enjoy legal protections while remaining excluded from national elections. That difference is not automatically unjust at every stage of residence.

The question is whether exclusion can continue indefinitely after someone has established an enduring life within the political community.

This is where Hand Democracy and Foot Democracy become relevant.

Hand Democracy concerns collective democratic self-government. Foot Democracy concerns meaningful political-community choice, including opportunities for lawful entry, remaining, and eventually becoming a member.

The two freedoms must be accommodated through legitimate institutions.

A political community may establish justified membership procedures. But existing members should not possess unlimited authority to keep durable residents outside political membership permanently.

Fukuyama asks how liberal democracies can sustain the civic identity needed for equal recognition and effective government.

The World Citizen framework adds another question: how can people acquire equal political standing in a community other than the one into which they were born?

Germany’s reforms show that nationality rules, residence requirements, and civic conditions can change. These are institutional choices. They require justification.

The Question After the End of History

Fukuyama’s emphasis on shared civic identity is not something the World Citizen framework must reject.

Political equality exists within institutions that people must maintain together.

But the question after the "end of history" is not only whether liberal democracy offers the best form of government.

It is also who has a meaningful opportunity to become a full participant in it.

Should the freedom to become a political equal remain primarily tied to the community into which a person was born, or should durable residence provide a meaningful route to equality in communities people choose to join?

The World Citizen framework favors the second direction while recognizing that democratic institutions need legitimate rules and shared commitments to sustain them.

It does not propose replacing liberal democracy. It asks how one of its central promises—equal political recognition—can be carried further.

References

Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18.
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (2006): 5–20.
Francis Fukuyama, “Why National Identity Matters,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 4 (2018): 5–15.
Francis Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018), Chapter 14.
Francis Fukuyama, “Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 5 (2018): 90–114.
German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s nationality law – significant changes,” June 27, 2024. Official source
German Federal Government, “Staatsangehörigkeit frühestens nach fünf Jahren,” October 30, 2025. Official source