Tag: Citizenship

  • Thomas Piketty: Property, Borders, and the Structure of Inequality

    Inequality is shaped not only by who owns what, but also by who belongs where

    A society has to answer at least two basic questions.

    Who owns what?

    And:

    Who belongs where?

    We usually treat these as different subjects.

    Property belongs to economics.

    Borders belong to immigration and citizenship.

    Thomas Piketty gives us a reason to question that separation.

    In the introduction to Capital and Ideology, he writes that every inequality regime rests on both “a theory of borders and a theory of property.”

    The property question concerns ownership and economic power.

    The border question concerns something different but equally fundamental: who belongs to the political community, who does not, and how political communities relate to one another.

    That connection matters for the World Citizen framework.

    Inequality is not produced only inside political borders.

    Borders themselves help structure people’s opportunities.

    Inequality Is Institutional

    A central idea in Piketty’s work is that inequality has no single natural or inevitable form.

    Societies organize property differently.

    They tax wealth differently.

    They build different education systems.

    They recognize different forms of ownership.

    They create different welfare institutions.

    And the level and structure of inequality change with those institutions.

    Inheritance provides a useful example.

    In France, Piketty estimates that the annual flow of inheritance was around 20–25 percent of national income between 1820 and 1910.

    By 1950, it had fallen to less than 5 percent.

    By 2010, it had risen again to about 15 percent.

    That long U-shaped movement is important.

    Inheritance did not remain equally important through time.

    Its role changed with economic growth, war, taxation, wealth accumulation, and other historical and institutional changes.

    The wider lesson is that inequality is not simply something society discovers.

    Society helps produce its form.

    The Property Question

    The property question determines more than who formally owns an asset.

    Property institutions influence who accumulates wealth.

    Who inherits it.

    Who receives income from capital.

    Who pays taxes.

    Who has access to housing, education, credit, and economic security.

    Effort matters.

    But effort takes place inside rules that individuals did not choose before entering society.

    Property rules are already there.

    Inheritance rules are already there.

    Tax systems are already there.

    Education systems are already there.

    Institutions help determine what choices are realistically available.

    Borders Are Institutions

    Piketty places another institutional question beside the property question: the border question.

    Every political system must determine who belongs to the political community and who does not.

    That distinction has consequences.

    Borders influence who may enter.

    Who may work.

    Who may remain.

    Who may be removed.

    Who may vote.

    Who may eventually become a political member.

    A border therefore does more than divide territory.

    Its political meaning is created by law.

    A mountain exists whether a legislature recognizes it or not.

    A political border is different.

    Law determines what crossing it means.

    Law determines which documents count.

    Law determines whether entry leads to temporary presence, residence, or eventually membership.

    This makes the border an institution.

    And institutions distribute opportunities.

    Two people with similar abilities and ambitions may face very different options because one can enter a political community and the other cannot.

    The border does not explain every difference in their lives.

    But it can determine which institutional environments are realistically available to them.

    That makes borders relevant to inequality.

    Inequality Across Political Communities

    This connects Piketty with another thinker discussed earlier in this series.

    Branko Milanovic has shown how strongly income prospects can be associated with where a person lives.

    His work makes the economic importance of location visible.

    Piketty approaches the problem differently.

    His contribution here is to place the border itself inside the institutional analysis of inequality.

    A person may face better opportunities somewhere else.

    Whether that person can reach those opportunities depends partly on the border regime.

    From the Border Question to Political Freedom

    This is where the World Citizen framework takes a further step.

    Piketty asks us to recognize that the border question is part of the organization of inequality.

    The World Citizen framework asks:

    What freedom should individuals have in relation to those borders?

    Piketty does not argue for Foot Democracy. That further step belongs to the World Citizen framework.

    Foot Democracy concerns the ability to choose among political communities in a meaningful way.

    That requires more than a formal right to leave one country.

    There must also be meaningful possibilities of Entry elsewhere.

    And Entry alone is not enough.

    As earlier articles in this series have argued, the relevant path is:

    Entry → Residence → Secure Membership → Political Equality

    Otherwise a person may cross a border and live for decades under another political system while remaining outside its full political membership.

    Borders Can Serve Legitimate Purposes

    Recognizing the distributive power of borders does not mean that every restriction is unjust.

    Political communities govern collectively.

    They maintain institutions.

    They finance public services.

    They protect rights.

    They may face housing constraints, administrative limits, security concerns, fiscal pressures, or sudden concentrations of migration.

    Those problems cannot simply be dismissed.

    But neither are border restrictions self-justifying.

    If borders are institutions with important distributive consequences, restrictions should be open to justification.

    What problem is being addressed?

    How serious is it?

    Is the restriction necessary?

    Are less restrictive alternatives available?

    Who bears the burden?

    And does a temporary difficulty become a permanent exclusion?

    These are political questions.

    They are not answered merely by pointing to the existence of a border.

    Inequality Is Not Only About Redistribution

    This changes the way we think about equality.

    A society might tax inheritance more heavily.

    It might improve public education.

    It might expand social insurance.

    Those reforms may substantially reduce inequality.

    But suppose a person’s opportunities also depend strongly on which political community that person can enter and join.

    Redistribution within each state then addresses only part of the institutional structure.

    A second question remains:

    How should access to political communities themselves be organized?

    This does not mean abolishing borders.

    It means recognizing that border rules are also rules about opportunity.

    Political Freedom Without a Borderless World

    The World Citizen framework does not require a world without borders.

    Nor does it require a single world government.

    Political communities can remain territorial.

    They can preserve collective self-government.

    Borders can continue to perform important functions.

    The question is whether political communities can do this without making full political membership effectively hereditary.

    A border regime can regulate Entry without making meaningful Entry impossible.

    It can respond to real pressures without converting temporary constraints into permanent exclusion.

    It can preserve political communities while allowing people a realistic pathway to become members elsewhere.

    That is the institutional challenge.

    Conclusion

    Thomas Piketty is best known for his work on wealth and inequality.

    But Capital and Ideology raises a broader institutional question.

    Every inequality regime must answer questions about property.

    It must also answer questions about borders.

    Who owns what?

    Who belongs where?

    The two questions are different.

    But both help structure the opportunities available to people.

    Piketty’s work reminds us that inequality is institutional.

    The World Citizen framework adds a further question:

    If borders help structure opportunity, what political freedom should individuals have in relation to those borders?

    The issue is not whether borders exist.

    It is whether the border regime leaves political membership overwhelmingly determined by birth—or gives people a meaningful way to become equal members of another political community.


    Notes

    Thomas Piketty writes in the introduction to Capital and Ideology that every inequality regime rests on both “a theory of borders and a theory of property.” See Thomas Piketty, Capital and Ideology, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020), Introduction, p. 5.

    Piketty later restated the importance of the property and border questions in Thomas Piketty, “Capital and ideology: A global perspective on inequality regimes,” The British Journal of Sociology 72, no. 1 (2021): 139–150.

    The French inheritance figures are from Thomas Piketty, “On the Long-Run Evolution of Inheritance: France 1820–2050,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (2011): 1071–1131. Piketty estimates annual inheritance flows at about 20–25 percent of national income between 1820 and 1910, less than 5 percent in 1950, and about 15 percent by 2010.

    The extension from Piketty’s border question to Foot Democracy, Migration Freedom, and residence-based political membership is an argument of the World Citizen framework and should not be attributed to Piketty.


    Further Reading

    For the relationship between location and economic opportunity, see “Branko Milanovic and the Citizenship Premium”.

    For citizenship as a form of birthright privilege, see “Ayelet Shachar and the Birthright Lottery.”

    For the move from nationality toward residence as the basis of political membership, see “From Nationality to Residence”.

    Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press, 2014).

    Thomas Piketty, Capital and Ideology, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020; French original, 2019).

    Thomas Piketty, A Brief History of Equality, trans. Steven Rendall (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2022).

    Thomas Piketty and Michael J. Sandel, Equality: What It Means and Why It Matters (Polity, 2025).

  • What Becomes of Nationality?

    Nationality is not one thing. It is a bundle of functions.

    Imagine two people.

    One was born in a country but has lived abroad for twenty years.

    The other was born elsewhere but has lived in that country for twenty years, works there, pays taxes there, raises a family there, and depends on its institutions every day.

    Which of them is more deeply connected to the political community?

    In “From Nationality to Residence”, I argued that durable residence should carry greater weight in political membership.

    But that argument creates another question.

    If political membership moves toward residence, what happens to nationality?

    Does nationality disappear?

    Do passports disappear?

    What happens to return rights, consular protection, pensions, family law, or legal identity?

    The answer is not to abolish nationality in one stroke.

    It is to separate the different things nationality currently does.

    Nationality is not one thing. It is a bundle of functions.

    One Status, Many Functions

    Modern states often use nationality to answer many different questions.

    Who belongs politically?

    Who may return?

    Who may remain securely?

    Who receives a passport?

    Who receives consular protection abroad?

    Which state may exercise diplomatic protection?

    Which legal connection matters for taxation, family law, succession, or social benefits?

    Who is protected against statelessness?

    These questions are often tied to one legal status.

    That creates administrative simplicity.

    But it does not prove that every function requires the same legal connection.

    This is the starting point of Nationality Function Decomposition.

    The idea is simple:

    separate the functions now bundled into nationality and ask what relationship each function actually requires.

    Some may continue to depend on nationality.

    Others may follow residence.

    Others may follow contribution history, family relationship, habitual residence, treaty status, or actual political membership.

    The guiding principle is:

    Decompose before abolishing, and replace before removing.

    Political Membership Can Move Without Moving Everything Else

    Political membership is the function the World Citizen framework moves most clearly toward durable residence.

    Residents live under the law, use public institutions, pay taxes, build families, and experience political decisions directly.

    That creates a political relationship that inherited nationality alone does not capture.

    But separating political membership from nationality does not require every other nationality-linked function to disappear at the same time.

    That is the advantage of decomposition.

    We Already Separate Functions

    This is not entirely hypothetical.

    Modern legal systems already contain examples in which functions usually associated with nationality are separated from the nationality of the person concerned.

    Consular Protection

    An EU citizen in a third country may find that their own member state has no embassy or consulate there.

    EU law allows that person, in such circumstances, to seek protection from the diplomatic or consular authorities of another EU member state under the same conditions as nationals of that state.

    Nationality still matters.

    But the authority providing protection does not always have to be the person’s own nationality state.

    That is already a partial separation of function from nationality.

    Travel Documents

    Ordinary passports are strongly connected to nationality.

    But international law already recognizes travel documents for some people who cannot use an ordinary national passport.

    The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons provide for Convention Travel Documents for qualifying refugees and stateless persons.

    These documents do not abolish nationality-based passports.

    They show something narrower:

    international travel documentation is not logically limited to an ordinary passport issued by a person’s nationality state.

    Political membership can therefore move toward residence even if travel documents remain nationality-linked for some time, or are later reorganized through another internationally recognized status.

    The two functions do not have to move together.

    Succession

    The European Union’s Succession Regulation provides another example.

    Its general rule uses the deceased person’s habitual residence to determine the law applicable to the succession as a whole.

    At the same time, a person may choose the law of a state whose nationality they possess.

    So nationality remains relevant.

    But it is not the only connecting factor.

    The function is organized through more than one legal relationship.

    These examples do not prove the World Citizen Society.

    They show that nationality functions can already be separated without the legal order collapsing.

    Return Requires Special Attention

    The right to return is more difficult.

    Nationality today often provides the strongest connection to a state for purposes of re-entry.

    But suppose someone becomes a full political member through durable residence.

    They leave temporarily for work, family, study, or travel.

    Should crossing the border turn that full member back into an outsider seeking fresh immigration permission?

    That would undermine the security of membership itself.

    If residence-based political membership is to be meaningful, secure membership must increasingly include a reliable right of return.

    That does not mean nationality-based return rights must immediately disappear.

    Both can coexist during transition.

    The important point is that return should increasingly follow secure membership, not inherited nationality alone.

    Different Functions Need Different Connections

    The same logic applies to social rights, taxation, family law, and succession.

    A pension may depend primarily on contribution history.

    Social assistance may depend on need and residence.

    Healthcare access may depend on residence or insurance.

    Tax liability may depend on residence, source, property, or business activity.

    Family-law and succession rules may use habitual residence, domicile, nationality, or other connecting factors.

    There is no reason to assume that one status must answer all of these questions.

    The better question is:

    Which connection best fits the function?

    That is the practical meaning of decomposition.

    Nationality Is Also an Identity

    There is an important objection.

    Nationality is not only a legal classification.

    For many people, it is also an identity.

    It can express language, history, family memory, national solidarity, cultural attachment, or a sense of belonging.

    Nationality Function Decomposition does not require those attachments to disappear.

    It asks a narrower institutional question:

    Which legal rights and powers really need to depend on nationality?

    A person may continue to identify strongly as Japanese, French, Mexican, Nigerian, or American even if some political or social functions come to depend more heavily on residence.

    Legal decomposition is not cultural erasure.

    The distinction is between identity and institutional function.

    They can overlap.

    They do not have to be identical.

    Statelessness Is a Warning

    Decomposition also has risks.

    If nationality-linked functions are removed before replacement institutions work, people can be left in legal uncertainty.

    Travel documentation may become unreliable.

    Return rights may weaken.

    External protection may become unclear.

    Children may face problems of legal identity.

    That is why statelessness prevention matters.

    Reform should not create freedom in one area by producing legal insecurity in another.

    Hence the second half of the principle:

    replace before removing.

    A useful nationality-linked protection should not disappear until another institution can perform the function reliably.

    One Possible Result: a Thinner Form of Nationality

    What might remain of nationality after decomposition?

    Possibly quite a lot.

    Nationality may continue to matter for travel identity, some forms of return, consular and diplomatic protection, anti-statelessness safeguards, and other external legal relationships.

    One possible result is a thinner form of nationality.

    Nationality would continue to exist, but it would no longer serve as the master status determining ordinary political rank.

    That is only one possible institutional outcome.

    The fixed principle is Nationality Function Decomposition.

    What remains should depend on which functions still genuinely require nationality.

    A More Complicated System?

    One status is simple.

    Function-specific institutions are more complicated.

    A person may have political membership in one community, pension rights accrued in another, tax obligations connected to several places, and family relationships recognized across borders.

    That requires coordination.

    But the current system is already more complicated than the word “nationality” makes it appear.

    Nationality often hides several distinct relationships inside a single label.

    Decomposition makes them visible.

    The question becomes not:

    Are you a citizen or a foreigner?

    but:

    What relationship is relevant to this particular right or obligation?

    That is a more demanding question.

    It may also be a more accurate one.

    Conclusion

    The World Citizen Society does not require nationality to disappear.

    It requires us to stop asking nationality to do everything.

    Modern law already shows that some nationality functions can be separated.

    Some functions may remain tied to nationality.

    Others may move toward residence.

    Others may depend on contribution, habitual residence, family relationship, treaty status, or secure political membership.

    The task is not abolition for its own sake.

    It is institutional precision.

    And no difficult external function should become an excuse for preserving inherited political hierarchy internally.

    Nationality is not one thing. It is a bundle.

    The rule for reform is:

    Decompose before abolishing, and replace before removing.


    Notes

    Nationality Function Decomposition means separating the legal functions currently bundled into nationality so that each can be retained, reassigned, or replaced according to the relationship it actually requires.

    Article 23 TFEU provides consular and diplomatic protection for unrepresented EU citizens in third countries through other EU member states under specified conditions.

    Article 28 of both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons provides for Convention Travel Documents for qualifying persons.

    Under Regulation (EU) No. 650/2012, habitual residence is the general connecting factor for succession, while nationality may still be used through a choice-of-law mechanism.

    Reducing the political importance of nationality should not create statelessness or remove useful protections before replacement institutions exist.


    Further Reading

    For the argument that durable residence should receive greater weight in political membership, see Resident Sovereignty.

    For the earlier argument about moving political membership from nationality toward residence, see “From Nationality to Residence”.

    For the full institutional treatment, see Toshiyuki Nishimura, The World Citizen Society: Political Freedom, Democratic Choice, and the Institutions of a New Society, Chapter 8, “What Becomes of Nationality?”, pp. 101–109.

    For the earlier analytical treatment of nationality as a bundle of separable legal functions, see Toshiyuki Nishimura, The World Citizen Revolution.